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Southe ast  As i a
N O OR H AI D I  H A S A N
A young student wearing ripped jeans, with long hair
and an earring, was called on by a group of people
wearing long flowing robes while he was having din-
ner at a food stall in a street of Yogyakarta. The
group of people harassed him and forced him to
leave his food. They accused him of being the trou-
blemaker of the crisis and disaster facing Indonesia
today. This situation occurred at the beginning of
August 2000, when the first national congress of mu-
jahidin was to be held on the re-establishment of the
s h a ri ca in Indonesia.
Islamic Radicalism
and the Crisis
o f t h e N a t i o n - S t a t e
Approximately two thousand people repre-
senting various ÔradicalÕ groups that are par-
ticularly in the public eye at moment, at-
tended the congress. Amongst the partici-
pants were Laskar Santri (Santri Paramilitary
Troops), Laskar Mujahidin (Mujahidin Para-
military Troops), Kompi Badr (Badr Compa-
ny), Brigade Taliban (Taliban Brigade), and
Pasukan Komando Mujahidin (Mujahidin
Command Force). A number of influential
Muslim figures gave talks at the congress,
such as Deliar Noer, Mansyur Suryanegara,
Syahirul Alim, and Alawi Muhammad. They
discussed one central theme: the applica-
tion of the Islamic s h a ri ca as highly neces-
sary in order to solve various problems and
disasters occurring in Indonesia today.
Recently, almost every week in Jakarta,
the Front Pembela Islam (The Front of the
Defender of Islam) conducts r a z z i a. They go
to cafs, discotheques, casinos, and other
venues which they accuse of being dens of
iniquity and break up the on-going activi-
ties without being hampered by security
agents. A few months ago, a major force
called Laskar Jihad (Jihad Paramilitary
Troops) even openly trained its members to
engage in combat and stated its readiness
to go to the battle field in the Moluccas. Sev-
eral times, similar groups wearing white
long-flowing robes and turbans took to the
streets in protest against President Abdur-
rahman WahidÕs policies, such as his pro-
posal to withdraw the MPR (PeopleÕs Con-
sultative Council) decree on the banning of
the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). They
also recently protested against the position
taken by KOMNASHAM (National Commis-
sion for Human Rights) in dealing with cer-
tain crucial issues.
Islamic radicalism
The phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in
Indonesia has emerged since the multi-di-
mensional crisis facing the country in 1997,
which resulted in the collapse of SoehartoÕs
regime. This movement marked a new
phase of the relationship between Islam
and the state, after the severe long-term re-
pression of political Islam by the state. Since
then, the existence of radical groups on the
political scene has become increasingly re-
markable and even ÔattractiveÕ. But what is
the background of the emergence of such
groups and is there any link between them
and the changing socio-political and eco-
nomic situations within the historical course
of the nation?
The efflorescence of Islamic radicalism in
Indonesia cannot be disassociated from the
fast current of modernization and develop-
ment projects run by the state during the
last 30 years. In the past, the state has not
provided sufficient space for all segments of
society to express themselves and their in-
terests in terms of modernization and devel-
opment. The expression of political Islam,
for instance, was often marginalized and re-
pressed by the authoritarianism of the state.
However, this apparently could not be
maintained, as there were moments when
the state had to face the so-called legitima-
tion crisis, which has increasingly expanded
since the end of the 1980s. In order to re-
strain the spread of this crisis, the state
should seek out new means such as, for ex-
ample, promoting a strategy of conservative
Islamization, particularly focused on the ac-
centuation of the Islamic symbols in the
public discourse, or accommodating the re-
ligious socio-political powers. A number of
organizations and institutions using Islamic
symbols have come to the fore. The Islamic
Court Bill was introduced, followed by the
presidential decree on the Compilation of
Islamic Law. Islamic s h a ri ca banks and insur-
ance companies were created everywhere,
and thousands of mosques were built under
the sponsorship of the state. In a very short
time, the state drastically moved away from
its former secular position and Muslim fig-
ures began to run the political scene.
Behind the conservative Islamization pro-
ject run by the state at that time, there were
many groups which, after losing hope, affili-
ated themselves to the project, or at least
felt that they were going in that direction.
Indeed, many groups saw this as a promis-
ing opportunity. Muslims who had been
forced to remain in the periphery and who
were given limited space in national politics
found a new way to enter the political, so-
cial and economic arenas of the state. Those
Muslim groups that had lost hope were bu-
reaucrats, politicians, merchants, business-
men and even military, to name but a few.
They believed that in this way they would
be able to change the fate of their society,
their nation, and their state Ð not to men-
tion their own.
Within these groups, there were also sub-
groups which had been active in their resis-
tance to the state before the mid-1980s and
had struggled to give voice to the establish-
ment of an Islamic state. At certain times
they resorted to violence, as demonstrated
by a group of young people led by Abdul
Qadir Djaelani, calling themselves the Pola
Perjuangan Revolusioner Islam (The Pattern
of Revolutionary Islamic Struggle), who
rushed the PeopleÕs Consultative CouncilÕs
assembly in March 1978. Two years before,
the actions of the Komando Jihad (Jihad
Command), led by H. Ismail Pranoto, erupt-
ed but were suppressed only in 1981. In that
same year, a group of people who were
loyal to Imran M. Zein carried out a set of at-
tacks on police stations and other govern-
mental services. The attacks culminated in
the hijacking of a Garuda Indonesia aero-
plane on 28 March 1981. Yet another attack
took place in 1984 in Tanjung Priok, North
Jakarta, when hundreds of people, com-
manded by Amir Biki, demanding the libera-
tion of their four colleagues were fired at by
military troops. This tragedy cost dozens of
lives. They did not stand a chance in the face
of the state repression. The peak of their im-
potency occurred when the state forced all
socio-political organizations to accept the
Pancasila. As a result, many, hiding their real
faces, became active in the underground. 
Radical neo-fundamentalism
When the crisis erupted, all that they had
worked to achieve was suddenly put to an
end. A number of sub-segments within the
wave of conservative Islamization began to
experience deep frustration due to this dra-
matic turn of events. Their aspirations of
slowly taking control over the economy
were shattered and their hopes of running
the political scene were destroyed. Despite
the last general election having demon-
strated attempts to accommodate all socio-
political powers, not all groups were satis-
fied. This was mostly due to a general feel-
ing of not having acquired sufficient repre-
sentation. They felt they were being margin-
alized again in the current of reformation,
which led Abdurrahman Wahid to the presi-
d e n c y .
Taking the aforementioned historical
processes into account, we can regard the
phenomenon of Islamic radicalism in In-
donesia as a site of resistance to the hege-
mony of the state by marginalized seg-
ments of society within the context of major
political, social and economic change. The
aim of this radicalism is to make these mar-
ginalized voices heard in the public sphere.
Since hegemony functions through dis-
course, Islamic radicalism often attempts to
produce a counter-discourse by criticizing
secular-national expression and offering al-
ternatives to it.
Olivier Roy, a French political scientist, has
encountered a similar phenomenon in
many Muslim countries today, which he
calls Ôradical neo-fundamentalismÕ. He de-
fines it as a movement attempting to re-Is-
lamize society at the grassroots level,
through the re-establishment of the Islamic
s h a ri ca, without being formed within an Is-
lamic state. This phenomenon arose from of
the failure of Islamism, a modern political Is-
lamic movement which claims to re-create a
true Muslim society, not merely by the ap-
plication of the Islamic s h a ri ca, but also by
creating a new Islamic order through the
revolutionary and militant political actions,
if necessary. The proponents of the move-
ment do not see Islam as a mere religion.
Rather, they see it as a political ideology
that should be integrated into all aspects of
society. However, Roy adds that even
though Islamism has failed since the 1980s,
particularly in terms of its original target of
creating an Islamic state, its resistance and
criticism to the authoritarianism of the state
have succeeded in forcing the latter to in-
troduce a conservative Islamization policy.
Ironically, such policies did not succeed in
eliminating Islamism; on the contrary, they
have broadened its constituency and sup-
p o r t e r s .
Roy indicates that radical neo-fundamen-
talism combines political and militant jihad
to protest against the secular West, with a
very conservative definition of Islam. He
also purports that it is a supra-national
movement, working beyond the borders of
the nation-state. There is a sort of interna-
tional network in which the actors of the
movement are trained and given financial
support. Furthermore, the movement at-
tempts to demonstrate the failure of the na-
tion-state, seen as caught between national
solidarity and globalization.
In the recent bombings in several major
cities in Indonesia these days, many suspect
the Indonesian Islamic radical groups. Presi-
dent Wahid even commanded the chief of
police to arrest an influential figure of the
Front of the Defenders of Islam, Sayyid Ali
Baaqil. No one knows what the future holds
for Indonesia, but one thing is clear: the vio-
lence, to quote Roy, Ôis more a sign of weak-
ness than the harbinger of a new wave of Is-
lamic militancyÕ. Because political Islam re-
mains in the periphery, it may never suc-
ceed in changing the strategic landscape of
the Muslim world. u
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